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Abstract—More than ever, with the proliferation of IoT devices
interconnected by 5G networks, it is crucial that IoT devices
and subsystems are protected from being compromised and
deployed for security attacks. Trust has been playing an essential
role in admitting an IoT device into a 5G system. However,
trust evaluation usually relies on historical interactions and
recommendations which are often not available at the first
encounter of the device and the system. As demonstrated in our
previous studies, the challenge-response mechanism is an effective
approach to learn the device’s behavior and build the knowledge
about its trustworthiness when prior knowledge is limited. It
is essential to design the challenge-response mechanism with
the intention of revealing the relevant and reliable information
about the trustworthiness of IoT devices. The question is how
to design the challenge and the common knowledge between
the system (challenger) and the devices (respondents) so that
the design engineers the devices to reveal their trustworthiness.
This paper tackles this question by exploring challenge-response
mechanism designs for the initial trust establishment in a mobile
and dynamic environment called personal space IoT system. The
paper develops principles for workable and consistent designs.
Extensive simulations are conducted to consolidate the principles
with numerous designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The personal space IoT system introduced in our earlier
work [1], [2] refers to a group of user’s devices, and other
IoT devices that are within the wireless communication radius
of the user’s devices and likely to provide services to the user.
A more powerful device acts as a controller for admitting
devices and monitoring their activities. Admitted devices of
the IoT subsystem, subsequently the supporting 5G networks
and applications, usually capture, process and communicate
personal data within the subsystem and with the external
entities to provide services. Moreover, the personal space IoT
system often deploys in a less secure environment. It is thus
essential for the system to safeguard and manage the devices’
behavior from their inception to the end of their lifecycle.
Trust has played a crucial role in enhancing the security of
IoT systems such as minimizing the ricks of insider attacks
by detecting and isolating misbehaving admitted devices. To
guarantee the integrity of IoT systems, the devices’ behavior
must constantly be evaluated in the form of trust not only
from their admission to the system but also entire their
lifecycle. Specifically, the device must establish some level
of trust before it is authenticated with the system for further
interactions. Thus, an initial trust establishment procedure,
conducting before the device is authenticated, is essential for
IoT systems when making decision on admitting new devices.
Currently, proposed trust evaluation schemes primarily rely
on the previous interactions and recommendations [3]–[6].
These methods work effectively on detecting misbehaving au-
thenticated devices in the system based on the above resources.
However, the prior resources for the initial trust evaluation are
often not available. Therefore, a mechanism for building the
knowledge about the trustees (new devices) for the initial trust
establishment is essential.
In our earlier studies [1], [2], we proposed a challenge-
response mechanism and a trust assessment scheme to evaluate
initial trust level of a device. To make the trust assessment
work, an implicit relationship between the information content
of challenges and the knowledge of the devices conveyed in the
responses is assumed. In this paper, we propose the mechanism
design for the challenge-response and explore possible designs
to develop guiding principles for workable designs so that
there exists the relationship between the challenges and the
devices’ knowledge. The purpose of the mechanism design is
to allow the initial trust assessment scheme to consistently
determine the initial trust level of a device by conducting
challenge-response operations with given workable designs.
Our challenge-response mechanism design consists of a set
of challenges and a set of possible responses to each challenge.
According to Shannon [7], the information content of a chal-
lenge in our design depends upon its probability of occurrence.
To design the information content of the challenges, we focus
on designing their probability distribution. In addition, the
relationship between the challenge and the devices’ knowledge
is reflected by the probability of the responses conditioned on
the given challenge. Therefore, we also design the conditional
probability distribution of the responses given a challenge so
that there always exists a correlation between the challenge and
the response, or equivalently the target devices’ knowledge.
No useful outcome from the challenge-response operation is
achieved if the devices are ignorant (uncorrelated) of the chal-
lenges making it meaningless for the initial trust assessment.
The question is how to design these probability distributions
that represent the consistent correlation between the challenge
and the device’s response.
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic design of the
challenge-response mechanism. Next, we introduce our def-
inition of the correlation between a challenge and a response
and the desired characteristics of a workable design for
the challenge-response mechanism. We then develop guid-
ing principles and demonstrate their feasibility in identifying
workable designs for the challenge-response mechanism. We
also investigate the initial trust establishment procedure us-
ing our challenge-response mechanism design via simulation.
Simulation results show that the challenge-response mecha-
nism designs established with developed principles allow the
challenge-response-based initial trust establishment to consis-
tently determine the initial trust level of new devices before
making decision on admitting a device.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives an overview of our proposed challenge-response mech-
anism. Section III describes the challenge-response mecha-
nism design. Section IV develops guiding principles for the
mechanism design. Section V presents the evaluation of our
proposed mechanism design. Section VI concludes the paper
and outlines our future work.
II. CHALLENGE-RESPONSE MECHANISM
Previous trust-related research studies have been mainly
investigated the trust of admitted entities during the system’s
ongoing operation. To the best of our knowledge, no related
work has yet attempted to provide a solution for establishing
the initial trust on an entity before it is admitted to the system
without prior knowledge. This section provides an overview of
our proposed challenge-response mechanism for establishing
initial trust of IoT device before its admission to the system.
Our proposed challenge-response (C-R) mechanism [2] is
a process of collecting evidence/knowledge for the initial
trust assessment scheme. It is performed intentionally by the
controller at the first encounter between the system and an
unknown device to investigate the device’s behavior and then
use this knowledge for the trust evaluation before deciding
on whether to admit it into the system. The C-R mechanism
is accomplished by exploiting typical interactions between the
controller and the devices at their first encounter such as in the
pairing process in Bluetooth Low Energy protocol as indicated
in our previous work [2].
In fact, the challenge-response scheme has been used in
various existing authentication approaches [8], [9] where a
party must provide a valid response to a challenge from
another party to be authenticated. The valid response can only
be generated by using an algorithm known by both parties.
However, our C-R mechanism aims at generating the knowl-
edge about unknown entities which have first encountered the
system. It does not require a prior shared secret or a known
algorithm between the challenger and the respondent which is
usually not feasible at the first encounter.
Our proposed C-R mechanism purely provides the process
of collecting the trust knowledge based on a set of challenges
and a set of responses. However, the information content of
the challenges and the relationship between the challenge and
the response is implicitly assumed and never investigated.
III. DESIGN OF CHALLENGE-RESPONSE MECHANISM
A. The Probabilistic Design
In our challenge-response design, following the mechanism
design in game theory [10], we design the challenge-response
through which gets the respondent playing strategies that
end up implementing exactly what the system intended. The
purpose of designing the challenge-response mechanism is to
maximize the knowledge about the truthfulness of respondents.
For the desired knowledge, two design elements are necessary
i) the information content of the challenges appropriate for
the potential respondents and ii) the relationship between the
challenge and the knowledge of respondents. The first element
is related to intention of the challenge-response process and
the second element is related to the assumed correlation
between the targeted response space and the challenge space.
The ultimate aim of the challenge-response mechanism is
to lead the respondents providing relevant information about
its trustworthiness. No useful outcome is achieved if the
respondents are ignorant (uncorrelated) of the challenges.
We assume that the mechanism design consists of a set of
n challenges and a set of m responses corresponding to each
challenge. A challenge is considered as a random variable with
a probability of occurrence which determines the information
content of the challenge. Let C denote the random variable
which can take on a value ci (i = 1..n), referring to a challenge
in the challenge set. To design the information content of the
challenge which must be appropriate for potential respondents,
we design a probability distribution P (C). Also, let R denote
the random variable which can take on a value rj (j = 1..m)
referring to a possible response in the response set. To reflect
the relationship between the challenge and the knowledge
of potential respondents, we design a conditional probability
distribution P (R|C) defining the probability of occurrence of
a response conditioned on a given challenge.
The main focus of this work is designing the two probability
distributions P (C) and P (R|C) of the challenge-response
mechanism so that it is workable and consistent for the initial
trust establishment. The design of probability distributions is
meaningless if they do not reflect the desired relationship
between the challenge and the knowledge of potential respon-
dents. The question is to what extent the probabilistic-based
challenge-response design is workable for the initial trust
assessment. The following section introduces our definition of
correlation measure and desired characteristics of a workable
challenge-response mechanism design.
B. Workable Challenge-Response Design
Correlation definition In our design, the measure of in-
formation content of a challenge ci is defined by following
Shannon’s definition [7].
I(ci) = − log2(p(ci)) (1)
In a challenge-response operation, given that the response rj
occurs, to determine the correlation between the given chal-
lenge and the received response, we work out the probability





Thus, given that a response rj occurred in a challenge-
response operation, the information content of the event that
the challenge was ci, can be derived as in (3).
I(ci|rj) = − log2(p(ci|rj)) (3)
We define the correlation between a challenge ci and a
response rj as the difference between the information content
of ci and the information content one learns that the challenge
was ci when he knows the response occurred in the challenge-
response operation is rj . It is denoted by ∆ij in (4).
∆ij = I(ci)− I(ci|rj) (4)
As defined in (4), the correlation value between a challenge
and a response can be a positive value representing the
occurrence of a related response, a negative or zero value
referring the occurrence of an uncorrelated response. The scale
of the correlation depends on the difference between the two
information content values. Note that the information content
of an event is equivalent to the surprise that one has when he
learns about the occurrence of the event [7]. In our design,
a positive correlation is expected when the response rj is
favorable/relevant to the challenge ci so that the occurrence of
this response brings additional knowledge about the challenge
ci. Thus, knowing rj will reduce the information content
(surprise) one learns that the challenge was ci. On the contrary,
a non-positive correlation value is desired when knowing the
occurrence of the response rj , the surprise one has when
he learns that the challenge was ci is not changed or even
increased compared to that before knowing rj .
By replacing (1), (2) and (3) to (4), we can determine the
conditions for a positive correlation as in (5).
∆ij = − log2(p(ci)) + log2(p(ci|rj)) > 0




Characteristics of a workable design Our probabilistic
design of the challenge-response mechanism defines the re-
lationship between the challenge set and the response set.
A workable design needs to reflect the relationship between
the challenge and the knowledge of the respondents so that
there is a consistent correlation between each challenge and
its responses. Specifically, the workable design must allow the
challenger to distinguish the favorable response from other
responses via their correlation measures. It is expected that
a positive correlation is given between each challenge and
its favorable response. Other responses are unintended and
given a non-positive correlation with the challenge. As a result,
the probabilistic design of the workable challenge-response
mechanism must maintain a consistent correlation measure to
all possible pairs of a challenge and a response.
According to information theory, learning about an unlikely
event’s occurrence is more informative than learning about the
occurrence of a more likely event. For a challenge-response
operation, when a highly unpredictable challenge is used to
judge the respondent, it is expected that the knowledge learned
from the response towards this challenge is more informative
than that from the response towards other more predictable
challenges. Therefore, in the C-R mechanism design, the
relationship between the challenge and the response must also
weight higher priority of the correlation associated with the
highly unpredictable challenge over the more likely challenges
when placing a trust level to the respondent.
In summary, a design of challenge-response mechanism
is workable for the initial trust establishment only when it
has such desired characteristics. Next section explores the
conditions and establishes the principles for workable designs.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF THE CHALLENGE-RESPONSE
MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section, we first demonstrate that without any prin-
ciple, a challenge-response design is just an ad hoc process
and is unlikely to achieve its goal of creating meaningful
knowledge for an initial trust assessment scheme. We then
develop guiding principles of our mechanism design and
validate the feasibility of the defined principles.
A. Mechanism Design without Principles
The challenge-response mechanism design to be validated
consists of a set of three challenges, c1, c2, and c3 and a set
of four responses, r1, r2, r3, and r4. We investigated designs
without any principles with a given P (C) = {0.7, 0.2, 0.1}.
By challenging the potential respondents with each challenge
c1, c2, c3, the challenger expects to receive favorable response
r1, r2, and r3, respectively. Specifically, given challenge c1,
if the respondent returns response r1, a positive correlation is
reasonable and desired. Otherwise, a non-positive correlation
is expected. The similar expectation is for challenges c2
and c3. We assess if there are combinations of P (C) and
P (R|C) designed without any principles, that do not provide
characteristics of a workable design.
Without any principles, many designs do not provide con-
sistent correlation measure. For example, Fig. 1a presents the
inconsistent correlation measures between each challenge and
its favorable response in designs D1 to D5. In all presented
designs, the correlation measures between each challenge and
its favorable response (∆11,∆22,∆33) are negative which


























































































Fig. 1: Designs without principles provide (a) negative correlation between
each challenge and its favorable response (b) no prioritization of correlation
The reason for this violation can be explained as follows. As
designed, response ri is related to all challenges with different
conditional probabilities. Therefore, when ri is designed as the
favorable response to challenge ci, the design of p(ri|ci) and
other p(ri|ck) decides the direction of the correlation. It can be
seen that when the relation of rij with challenge ci is weaker
than that of ri with other ck, i.e., (p(ri|ci) < p(ri|ck),∀k 6=
i), the condition in (5) is violated leading to a non-positive
correlation. For instance, with the design D2 described in Fig.
2a, for any pair of each challenge and its favorable response,
p(ri|ci) is always smaller than other p(ri|ck). This implies
that the response ri has a weak relation with the challenge ci.
Moreover, it has stronger relations with other challenges with
higher probabilities. Such designs do not meet the condition
in (5) which results in a negative correlation between each
challenge and its favorable response.
Although many other designs (without principles) built with
consistent correlation for a workable design, they are not built













































Fig. 2: Example of probabilistic design of validated designs
of correlation between challenge c3 and its favorable response
is expected to be the largest since c3 is the most unpredictable
challenge. However, as represented in Fig. 1b, with validated
designs (D6 to D10), the correlation between challenge c3
and its favorable response is less than the correlation between
challenge c2 and its favorable response.
This violation can also be explained as follows. Each
challenge is spread out to all possible responses with different
conditional probabilities. The distribution of those conditional
probabilities and the unpredictability of a challenge directly
affect the size of the correlation. It implies the importance of
designing the ratio among conditional probability distributions
and the ratio among the unpredictability of challenges so
that the correlation measure is inversely proportional to the
unpredictability of the challenge. Figure 2b describes D8 in
which the ratio between conditional probability distribution
p(rj |c2) and p(rj |c3) (∀j = 1..4), and the ratio between
p(c2) and p(c3) are not designed carefully. Hence, the size
of correlation associated with c3 and its favorable response is
less than that of c2 while c3 is more unpredictable than c2.
Many designs established without any principles do not
have desired characteristics for a workable challenge-response
mechanism for the initial trust assessment. Therefore, it is es-
sential to establish principles of the challenge-response mech-
anism design towards a consistent trust assessment model.
B. Principles of the Challenge-Response Mechanism Design
As demonstrated earlier, the challenge-response mechanism
should be designed with guiding principles so that it is built
with desired characteristics of a workable design. From the
desired features of a workable challenge-response design, we
develop principles of our mechanism design as below.
Consistent correlation: Correlation measure associated
with each challenge and its favorable response is positive;
otherwise, it is non-positive.
The condition entailed in this principle is as below.{
∆ij > 0, if rj is favorable response of ci, ∀i, j
∆ij ≤ 0, otherwise
(6)
Prioritization of correlation of highly unpredictable
challenge over other challenges: Correlation between a
challenge and its favorable response is inversely proportional
to the challenge’s unpredictability.
The condition entailed in this principle is given by (3) where
rk, rt are favorable responses of ci, cj , respectively.
∆ik > ∆jt, ∀i, j & p(ci) < p(cj) (7)
C. Validation of Established Principles
This section validates the feasibility of the defined principles
of our mechanism design. We show that for a design of
P (C), by establishing our defined principles, there always
exist a number of configurations of P (R|C) so that the
combinations of P (C) and P (R|C) are workable for the
challenge-response operation. Given a found workable design,
we determine the boundary of its parameters (probabilities)
so that modifying the parameters within their boundaries,
designs with new parameters are still workable. On the other
hand, when any modified parameters are exceeded identified
boundaries, designs with these parameters are unworkable.
We follow the defined principles to find workable designs.
Specifically, we generate the conditions entailed with the
principles and use them as the constraints to search for
the workable designs. With a found workable design, we
determine the boundaries for its parameters by simultaneously
increasing or decreasing parameters by a predefined value.
TABLE I: Workable designs (D2, D3, D4) and unworkable designs
(D1, D5) with P (C) of {0.7; 0.2; 0.1}
Design p(rj |c1)(∀j = 1..4) p(rj |c2)(∀j = 1..4) p(rj |c3)(∀j = 1..4)
D1 0.07; 0.61; 0.01; 0.31 0.19; 0.49; 0.01; 0.31 0.49; 0.07; 0.13; 0.31
D2 0.61; 0.07; 0.01; 0.31 0.19; 0.49; 0.01; 0.31 0.13; 0.07; 0.49; 0.31
D3 0.70; 0.16; 0.10; 0.04 0.28; 0.58; 0.10; 0.04 0.22; 0.16; 0.58; 0.04
D4 0.71; 0.17; 0.11; 0.01 0.29; 0.59; 0.11; 0.01 0.23; 0.17; 0.59; 0.01
D5 0.15; 0.73; 0.11; 0.01 0.29; 0.59; 0.11; 0.01 0.62; 0.17; 0.20; 0.01
To show the feasibility of our defined principles, we present
designs for several configurations of P (C) with three chal-
lenges. We assume that there are four possible responses to
each challenge. Moreover, it is supposed that the favorable
response to each challenge is given with the same label with
the respective challenge.
Tables I and II present the probabilistic designs of a found
workable design D3, two workable designs at the boundaries
(D2 and D4) and two unworkable designs (D1 and D5), with
the P (C) of {0.7, 0.2, 0.1} and {0.05, 015, 0.8}, respectively.
In Table I, for a workable design described in D3, we deter-
mine the boundaries of p(rj |ci), (j = 1..3), by simultaneously
increasing or decreasing them by 0.01 until the principles are
violated. The value of p(r4|ci) is the subtraction of 1 and other
p(rj |ci). The results show that there are 11 workable designs
within the boundaries. The boundaries are the parameters
described in designs D2 and D4. For example, the boundaries
for p(r1|c1) is from 0.61 to 0.71, p(r1|c2) is from 0.19 to
0.29, etc. If any parameter in a design is beyond its boundary
found at D2 and D4, it becomes unworkable as the principles
are no longer satisfied. For instance, in D1 and D5, p(r1|c1)
is 0.07 and 0.15, respectively, which exceeds the boundary.
Hence, the first principle is not guaranteed.
Figure 3 presents the correlation measures from designs
whose parameters are described in Table I. As shown in Fig.
3a, with designs D2, D3 and D4 the correlation between
any challenge and its favorable response is always positive,
whereas with designs D1 and D5, only correlation measure
between challenge c3 and its favorable response is positive. In
addition, with designs D2, D3, D4, the size of correlation

















































































































































































Fig. 3: Correlation measures from designs within the boundaries and beyond the boundaries with given P(C) of {0.7, 0.2, 0.1}
the largest which satisfies the prioritization of correlation of
the most unpredictable challenge. As indicated in the Figs.
3b - 3d correlation measures between challenge c1, c2, c3
and the responses other than their favorable response are
always non-positive with designs D2, D3, and D4. In contrast,
with designs D1 and D5, there always exist some positive
correlation measures where the non-positive is expected.
TABLE II: Workable designs (D2, D3, D4) and unworkable designs
(D1, D5) with P (C) of {0.05; 0.15; 0.8}
Design p(rj |c1)(∀j = 1..4) p(rj |c2)(∀j = 1..4) p(rj |c3)(∀j = 1..4)
D1 0.01; 0.57; 0.01; 0.41 0.01; 0.51; 0.01; 0.47 0.49; 0.09; 0.01; 0.41
D2 0.57; 0.01; 0.01; 0.41 0.03; 0.53; 0.03; 0.41 0.01; 0.09; 0.49; 0.41
D3 0.66; 0.10; 0.10; 0.14 0.12; 0.62; 0.12; 0.14 0.10; 0.18; 0.58; 0.14
D4 0.70; 0.14; 0.14; 0.02 0.16; 0.66; 0.16; 0.02 0.14; 0.22; 0.62; 0.02
D5 0.14; 0.70; 0.14; 0.02 0.16; 0.66; 0.16; 0.02 0.62; 0.22; 0.14; 0.02
Similarly, given a found workable design as described in
D3 in Table II, we can find the boundaries for parameters of
the workable designs. There are 14 workable designs whose
parameters are within the identified boundaries. For example,
the boundaries for p(r2|c2) is from 0.53 to 0.66.
Figure 4 shows the correlation measures from five different
designs described in Table II. As seen in Fig. 4a, with workable
designs D2, D3, and D4, as c1 is the most unpredictable
challenge, the correlation associated with c1 and its favorable
response is positive and has the largest size compared to
that of other challenges. Moreover, other correlation mea-
sures between challenges and the responses other than the
favorable response are non-positive as represented in Figs.
4b - 4d. On the contrary, with designs D1 and D5, since
their parameters are beyond the boundaries of the workable
design, the correlation between challenges c1 and its favorable
response are negative as shown in Fig. 4a. Furthermore,
the correlation between each challenge and an un-intended
response is sometimes positive as shown in Figs. 4b - 4d.
In summary, by establishing our defined principles, for any
given configuration of P (C), we are always able to find
workable designs and the boundaries for their parameters so
that they are appropriate challenge-response designs for the
initial trust establishment in certain environments.
V. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
In this paper, the correlation between the challenge and
the response occurred in a single C-R round is interpreted
to an instant trust value. The initial trust level of a respondent
is updated once a round completed and it is a weighted
aggregation of instant trust values from all C-R rounds. The
computation of the instant trust value from round kth, τk, and
the initial trust value after k rounds, T (k), are given in (8) and
(9). Note that, α is the translating parameter to scale up the
trust value to [-1, 1], ωk is the weight value assigned to the
instant trust value from round kth, and ∆ij is the correlation
between ci and rj occurred in round kth.
τk = α∆ij (8)
T (k) = (1− ωk)T (k−1) + ωkτk (9)
Evaluation setup We evaluate our proposed design with a C-R
mechanism that consists of three challenges with a given P (C)
of {0.05, 0.15, 0.8}. Assuming that there are four possible
responses to each challenge and one of them is the favorable
response to the challenge. We assume that each challenge ci
has its favorable response ri, (i = 1,2,3). We select the design
D3 described in Table II for our evaluation. The challenge
at each round and corresponding response to the selected
challenge are chosen based on their corresponding probability
described in D3 in Table II.
We first conduct 90 tests of the single-round C-R process
and determine the obtained instant trust value from each test.
Parameter α is set to 1/(2x), where x is the size of the largest
correlation that can be obtained from the design to scale up
the instant trust value to [-1, 1].






































Fig. 5: Instant trust value from 1-round challenge-response operation
As shown in Fig. 5, when the respondent provides a



















































































































































































Fig. 4: Correlation measures from designs within the boundaries and beyond the boundaries with given P(C) of {0.05, 0.15, 0.8}
(0 < Tk ≤ 1) is placed on the device. Otherwise, a distrust or
neutral value (−1 ≤ Tk ≤ 0) is placed on the respondent
depending on the size of the correlation measure and the
used translating parameter. For example, at many tests, the
instant trust value is at a neutral position (Tk = 0) since
the respondent fails to provide a favorable response to the
challenge. At the test 15th, 40th and 75th the challenge was
the most unpredictable challenge c1, and the device returns a
favorable response r1. Thus, a high trust value (Tk = 0.5) is
placed on the device. In many other tests, the device provides
unintended responses, it is given some distrust levels (Tk < 0).
This investigation demonstrates that the tested design provides
desired characteristics of a workable design.
We further conduct a five-round C-R process repeated in
100 times using design D3 presented in Table II to validate if
the obtained initial trust value is reliable with various device’s
behaviors to different challenge patterns. For the initial trust
computation, the weight for the instant trust value from the
current round is set to 0.3 if the response is the favorable
response. Otherwise, it is set to 0.7. With this setup, the speed
for a device to gain its trust is slower than to lose its trust.
Figure 6 shows typical trends of the updating of initial trust
value over the experiment from selected simulations. It can
be seen that the device gains its trustworthiness if it keeps
responding favorable responses to the respective challenges.
The more trust is placed on the device if the selected challenge
is highly unpredictable. For example, in simulation 40th, the
device gains its trust when it consistently returns a favorable
response to the highly unpredictable challenges c1 and c2.
Moreover, these trends show that the device loses its trust
when it does not consistently provide the relevant information
to the challenge. The trend from simulation 15th shows that
when a device first returns a favorable response to challenge
c1 and then fails to do so in all other rounds, it quickly loses
its trust. The device will not recover its distrust level if it
cannot provide a favorable response to the respective challenge
as presented in the trend of simulation 35th. These trends
show that the initial trust establishment consistently measures
reasonable initial trust value per various device’s behaviors.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the principles for guiding mechanism
designs for our proposed challenge-response-based initial trust
assessment scheme. The information content of the challenges
and their relationship with the respondents’ knowledge are























































































































Fig. 6: Initial trust value from a 5-round challenge-response process
designed in the form of probability distributions. Our estab-
lished principles ensure that the design will be workable for
the required environment. Extensive simulations are conducted
to consolidate the principles with numerous designs. The
next plans are to propose a mapping algorithm to map the
probabilistic design of the challenge-response mechanism to
practice and implement the challenge-response mechanism-
based initial trust establishment for practical 5G environ-
ments.
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